If you support the eradication of abortions, you’ll support the use of contraceptives

If you don’t support the use of contraceptives, then you don’t really care about ending abortions.

The support for such an idea is that because contraceptives prevent unwanted pregnancies, contraceptives cut down on abortion. The effect of contraceptives is that the rate of abortions are lowered because the rate of unwanted pregnancies are likewise lowered. If women aren’t getting pregnant then they can’t get abortions.

The problem for those who are against abortion and contraceptives, however, is that they can’t support one to end the other. For such people (mostly Catholics), to support birth control is to support something unnatural in the act of intercourse, something that prevents life from coming about. Thus, even if supporting contraceptives would lower the rate of abortion they cannot support contraceptives, for as the saying goes, “two wrongs don’t make a right.”

Does the above mean that Catholics aren’t ultimately pro-life though? By banning the use of contraceptives among their members, are they implicitly supporting the act of abortion? As someone who is pro-contraceptive (so long as the contraceptive is non-abortive), I would argue in favor of Catholics and say that they’re still pro-life because the argument presents a false dichotomy.

The choice isn’t, “Support contraceptives/raise abortion rates.” For one, Catholics support abstinence programs, which may actually work contrary to popular myth, so it’s not as though Catholics are doing nothing to lower abortion rates. But more importantly, there are other alternatives to ending abortion rather than lowering the conception rate via contraception. Catholics can (and do) support abstinence, which is the most effective way at avoiding pregnancy. They also support a woman bringing the child to term and if she is unwilling or unable to care for the child after that they support adopting the child out to someone who can. Likewise, there are Catholic charities that help women with the medical expenses during birth and even after birth.

Thus, Catholics are not against helping women or even helping to prevent abortion through social means (that is, by increasing the style of living of the poor). The problem for Catholics is they have one immoral action (the taking of an innocent human individual) and another immoral action (actively preventing conception). For them, you cannot commit one immoral action to prevent another, at least not on a regular basis.

Likewise, the situation isn’t so “either/or” as it seems. If we look at the case of lying to Nazis in order to protect Jews, this is an “either/or” case. In this case, lying becomes moral because it protects a human life. Were you to tell the truth, it would mean the immanent death of the Jews you’re hiding. In the case of contraceptives and abortion, however, if a woman doesn’t use contraceptives and ends up pregnant, it does not necessarily follow that an abortion will occur. She could carry the child to term and if abortion were outlawed, this would be her only legal option at this point.

It’s illogical to think that if one doesn’t support contraceptives that one supports a higher abortion rate. Rather, one can still hope for a lowered abortion rate by helping women carry their children to term.

Finally, the argument is extremely superfluous and really doesn’t add much to the discussion on whether or not abortion is moral. If abortion is the taking of an innocent human life and humans have innate dignity and a right to life, then that settles the issue. It could very well be that all pro-life advocates come out tomorrow and admit that they just want to prevent women from having sex and don’t care about abortion, such an action still wouldn’t negate the scientific and philosophical arguments the pro-life side has used.

It could be that Catholics are misguided in their prohibition of contraceptives in ending abortion, but this misguided knowledge doesn’t somehow justify abortion. It would only show Catholics to be ignorant, but it would say nothing about the morality of abortion.

With the above in mind, it should be seen that the newest pro-choice argument (or newest version of an old argument) is a laughable attempt to discredit the opposition without actually dealing with the substance of what the opposition has to say. It skirts the issue of the morality of abortion and simply creates a false construct so it can engage in ad hominem tu quoque. Such an argument should be dealt with quickly or responded with, “Even if what you say is true, how does that make abortion moral?” At the end of the day, advocates of such an argument generally lack the knowledge to argue on the morality of abortion, at least beyond, “It’s a woman’s right!” They offer little to not scientific of philosophical backing in their argument and instead argue from emotion. Unfortunately, we must deal with such people in the hopes of swaying others.

I hope to offer up a review of Beckwith’s article soon, but think for a moment on what the world would look like if we didn’t believe that humans were intrinsically dignified. This would mean that we would be only as valuable as what we do, our value would be limited to our contribution to society. Is such a world survivable or plausible?

1) Pro-life people don’t really care about how many abortions are prevented because every single person who is pro-life is against contraception

2) Pro-life people don’t care about preventing abortions because they’re against Planned Parenthood (the argument is Planned Parenthood prevents abortions, thus pro-life people should be for Planned Parenthood)

3) Pro-life people only care about preventing women from having sex and they want to turn women into baby-making machines (O NOES!)

The saddest part about this whole debate I’ve been having is the person cannot name one book on the issue that she has read. Not one book for the pro-choice stance or one book against it. Yet, the person claims to be an expert on this issue because she’s written a lot of blog posts on pro-life issues.

The following response does use harsh rhetoric, calling the person “ignorant” and using a “stupid argument.” Such rhetoric is quite intentional on my part. I am attempting to point out to the person exactly where she stands on this issue and that she is, in fact, in ignorance on it. By admitting that she hasn’t studied the issue, she has admitted ignorance. Likewise, I don’t believe one should go after wolves with a whiffle bat and a Nerf gun.

My response to such drivel is as follows:

The Op-ed says that even though a fetus is a human person, for the sake of feminism we must be allowed to kill the fetus. While openly honest, one must wonder if the writer took her beliefs to their logical end. For instance, should men who don’t fully embrace feminism be killed for the sake of feminism? Should male CEO’s who make more than their female counterparts be hung from public squares and made an example of?

While equality for women is a vitally important issue, it does not trump the issue of life. The right to live trumps all other rights. If we lose the right to live, if our right to live is trumped by another right, then we have no rights. If we have no life, we have no rights. If we have no right to live, then we have no rights to claim.

Recently, Alaska has been in the news for putting a parental notification law on the ballot. Of course, multiple people have jumped up to say that such a law somehow violates women’s rights. How the law violates women’s rights when these same “women” (under-aged girls) have to get parental consent for medical treatment, not just notification. This means Planned Parenthood argues that when it comes to killing a fetus, a 15 year old has a right to her body, but when it comes to consenting to a field trip or the like, the 15 year old no longer has a right over her body. This is a contradiction, but I digress.

I’ve been thinking more and more about people who are against abortion, but then qualify their statement to say, “But I would never make it illegal for others.” This forces the question, “Why not?” The only proper reason to be against abortions is that one believes the fetus to be a human person. If one believes the fetus to be a human person, then it should follow that one believes the fetus has rights.

One way to look at it is by the possible logical scenarios for abortion:

(1) All fetuses are persons; all persons are entitled to the basic right to life; therefore, all fetuses have the basic right to life (abortion is always wrong, with certain medical exceptions)

(2) Some fetuses are persons; all persons are entitled to the basic right to life; therefore, some fetuses have the basic right to life (abortion is sometimes wrong)

(3) At least some fetuses are not persons; all persons are entitled to the basic right to life; therefore, at least some fetsuses do not have the basic right to life (at least some abortions are not wrong)

(4) No fetuses are persons; all persons are entitled to the basic right to life; therefore, no fetuses have a basic right to life (no abortion is wrong)

This is what the abortion debate boils down to, whether or not a fetus is a human person. Arguments (2) and (3) make little sense because it raises unanswerable questions; “What makes one fetus a person and another fetus a non-person?” Unless the fetus is dead, it seems any standard we could offer would automatically be arbitrary. If we argue on size, then would this mean a person who is 5’4″ is less of a person than someone who is 6’0″? If we say that a fetus has to be at least a foot long in order to be a person, how did we come to such a conclusion? What is to prevent us from saying person hood begins at 5’5″ and all people below such a mark are not persons?

Being a person must be based on something non-arbitrary, which makes arguments (2) and (3) difficult to support.

It seems that the debate comes down to arguments (1) and (4). If a fetus is a person, then that fetus is entitled to certain rights. If the fetus is not a person, then the fetus is entitled to no rights.

The problem with argument (4) is that it runs into the same problem that arguments (2) and (3) do, namely that it establishes an arbitrary definition for “person.” What is the difference between a fetus two minutes prior to birth and an infant two minutes after birth? What makes one a person and the other a non-person? Is it the location outside of the womb? If so, what makes the womb different? Why is it a person outside of the womb, but not inside when nothing genetically has changed for the fetus? The standard is simply arbitrary.

If someone says, “I agree in basic human rights” and also “I believe that fetuses are human persons,” then by logical necessity, that person must also argue against legalized abortion. We have laws against murder because we believe that humans are entitled to a basic right to life. If fetuses are persons then they are also entitled to this same right. For instance, I am allowed to kill a deer for sport or for a meal. I am not, however, allowed to do this with a human person. This is because humans have higher rights than animals. Abortion is the act of taking a life, therefore if all humans have a basic right to life (and when this right is violated, the violator is charged with murder) and fetuses are persons, it follows that abortion should be illegal.

Thus, such an argument is illogical:

(1a) All fetuses are persons; all persons have the right to life; therefore, abortion should be legal

The conclusion contradicts the second premise, “all persons have the right to life.” If we are to be consistent in believing that all human persons have a right to life and that all fetuses are human persons, it follows that killing a human fetus – when the existence of the fetus does not post an immanent threat to the mother’s life – is, in every case, wrong.

Many people are starting to realize that a human fetus is also a human person. I even did an entire series relating to this issue over at Virtue and Life. Some, however, argue that not all human persons are entitled to the right to life. These arguments are broken down as such:

(5) All human persons have the right to life

(6) Some human persons have the right to life

(7) Some human persons do not have the right to life

(8) No human persons have the right to life

Very few people will argue in favor of argument (8). Anyone who supports argument (8) would have to be against all laws against murder. Such a person could argue that one’s right to life is dependent upon one’s ability to either trick others into letting him live, or kill others. There are very few people in this world who believe this.

Some ethicists do fall into arguments (6) and (7). One of the most famous arguments was brought forth by Judith Jarvis Thompson when she argued in her essay, “A Defense of Abortion,” that even a fetus who is a human person is not entitled to the right to life. Her argument can be summarized as :

(a) All persons have an autonomous right to the use of their individual bodies

(b) A person’s right to his body trumps anyone’s right to life insofar as anyone is relying on the person’s body for survival (e.g. “Bob has an autonomous right to his body. John relies on Bob’s body for survival. Bob has the right to terminate John’s life because John is relying on Bob’s life)

(c) Therefore, since a fetus relies on a mother’s body in order to survive, even though the fetus is a person, his right does not trump the mother’s right over her own body

The problem with Thompson’s argument – and therefore with arguments (6) and (7) – is that premise (a) doesn’t work. The premise is fallacious in that it’s a case of special pleading, that is, we would only say a person has an autonomous right to one’s body in the case of abortion, but not in other cases. For instance, a child is reliant upon the parent for survival. If the parent goes out to a club one night and leaves the child at home, under Thompson’s argument the parent shouldn’t be charged with neglect. After all, the child is reliant upon the bodily actions of the parent, meaning the parent’s right to his body trumps the child’s right to live.

The above, however, is a priori wrong. We innately know that such an action is wrong and allow our laws to reflect that such an action is wrong. Likewise, it ignores that we have an ethical obligation to others, specifically our children.

However, instead of going into a long explanation here of why both premise (a) and premise (b) are false, there is an excellent article by Francis Beckwith titled, “Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion, and Unplugging the Violinist” that does an excellent job of dealing with these issues.

In short, arguments (6) and (7) end up being implausible; we end up creating an arbitrary standard to say that “John is not entitled to the right to life, but Susan is.” Arbitrary standards, though meant to be subjectively applied, end up being universally applied. Thus, to take the rights away from one person inevitably means other people will also have their rights taken away.

Logically and scientifically only the combination of arguments (1) and (5) fit with reality. The other arguments or any other combination either is internally inconsistent or inconsistent with reality. It would appear that if one wants to be logical in looking at abortion and factual, one would have to agree that all fetuses are persons, that all persons are entitled with the basic right to live, and because of these premises, abortion ought to be illegal (with few exceptions).

Within Western culture a great divide has grown between the metaphysical views of materialism and supernaturalism and such a divide has slowly impacted how Western society treats its weak.[1] The vast majority of lawmakers in Western culture, regardless of religious claims, operate under a materialistic worldview. Such a worldview lacks a proper justification for absolute morality and in many cases justifies the extermination of the weak. The Judeo-Christian worldview alternatively, provides the best justification for an absolute morality that protects the weak. The Judeo-Christian worldview best fits with what humans know a priori to be right, namely that a society should take care of its weak rather than bring them harm.

The Naturalistic Metaphysic

The naturalistic metaphysic is, without question, the predominant metaphysical view for Western academia and government officials. In Europe, the naturalistic metaphysic is slowly becoming the metaphysical view for the majority of the populace. America stands out as a lone exception in the Western world in terms of the metaphysical view of the populace; however, even America’s academia and government leaders tend to, at the very least, function under a naturalistic worldview. With it being the predominant metaphysical view for Western leaders, it is vitally important to understand what naturalism entails.

Naturalism, or materialism, teaches that the entire world can be explained purely in natural terms. Whereas the ancients would often implore some supernatural explanation for a physical cause, the naturalist views the universe as a closed system, one where only natural explanations can be used. The metaphysical view of naturalism begot the epistemological teaching of empiricism, that is, all that can be known absolutely must be physically verified. If something cannot be physically verified, then that something is non-absolute or non-existent. Thus, the naturalist creates his own self-fulfilling epistemology so that not only does he begin with the presupposition that the physical world is all that is there, but then stacks the odds by saying one can only prove one’s case under the arbitrary guidelines of empiricism.

In explaining the origins of the universe, a naturalist must advocate that the universe, in some form or the other, has always existed. As David Mills writes,

“…the universe, in one form or another, in one density or another, always existed. There was never a time when the mass-energy comprising our universe did not exist, if only in the form of an empty oscillating vacuum or an infinitely dense theoretical point called a singularity, consisting of no volume whatsoever.”[2]

According to Mills and other materialists, the universe and all within has always existed, but just not in its current form. Explicit in such a teaching is that the foundations for life were entirely impersonal, meaning that any sense of personality is truly an illusion. Under materialism, the “personable-ness” of a creature is irrelevant and ultimately an elusive mystery as empiricism has yet to explain the immaterial nature of personhood. After all, empiricism has failed to explain emotions, rationality, transfer of knowledge, and other immaterial acts. All of these are considered vital to being a person, but under empiricism, such acts are, at best, illusionary. Naturalism is left without an explanation for what makes humans human.

Judeo-Christian Metaphysic

Although the Judeo-Christian worldview metaphysic relies on the principle of Genesis 1, specifically that there was a personal creator behind all of creation, it is not limited to a literal reading of the passage. Naturally, the Judeo-Christian metaphysic teaches that there are two “metaphysical realms,” that which has been created and that which is uncreated. Whereas naturalism only has one metaphysical realm – material – Christianity divides metaphysics into “created” and “uncreated”. Under the “created” category fall the two substances of material and immaterial. The Judeo-Christian worldview teaches that some creations are purely immaterial while others are purely material, with humanity being a combination of the two substances.[3]

The second metaphysical plane is the uncreated, which is solely inhabited by God. This means that God is above and wholly other to His creation. By being above His creation, He is not subject to the laws of the creation unless He subjects Himself to those laws. Such a physical order is considered “natural law” in Christian circles. Traditional Christian philosophy has taught that just as God created a physical order to the universe, He also created an immaterial order to the universe via ethics. This view is considered “natural moral law.” The Judeo-Christian worldview teaches that all humans are subject to the natural moral law by virtue of being human. God, being above His creation, is able to establish the moral law without the moral law being above Him.

Metaphysics Impact on Morality

Some people might like to act as though the above competing worldviews are simply for one’s own benefit, that there is no real impact that either worldview has upon the individual adherents, but such a view is wrong; metaphysics ground a foundation for our morality and how we justifies our morality. If John were to tell George, “George, it is wrong for you to steal from me,” George could ask “Why is it wrong for me to steal from you?” No matter how John replies, at the end of the day he has to provide a metaphysical defense. Whether that be theft doesn’t aid in the survival of the species or that God established a law for all humans to follow, John’s statement, “It is wrong to steal” must have some metaphysical backing, otherwise he is merely expressing a desire that doesn’t necessarily have to be followed.

They key role metaphysics plays in morality is that morality requires a purpose. Without a purpose for an entity, there is no reason for morality other than “survival” or personal happiness (both of which are vague terms under naturalism). Thus, our metaphysics will often construct the moral view that we hold. If we have an impersonal metaphysic, then our morality will likewise tend to be impersonal if logically consistent with our metaphysic. If we have a personal metaphysic, then our morality will tend to be personal.

Naturalism begins with an impersonal metaphysic and subsequently has an impersonal ethic. The ethics of naturalism hinge upon survival and what the majority believes helps aid in survival. Mills goes so far as to say that morality is based upon the majority consensus of a society when he writes, “Because such unethical behavior is condemned by the majority, laws exist for the protection of the ‘general welfare.’”[4] In understand Mills, he is advocating that the majority of a society will determine what aids in survival, which determines the morality of that society, and finally that will establish the laws for that society.

It follows that naturalism has no recourse for changing the morality of a society. For instance, if naturalism is followed logically, introducing pornography to underage children is not immoral because it does not affect the survival of a society and because “innocence” is illusionary.[5] Under a consistent naturalistic worldview, people such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, or William Wilberforce were ultimately “immoral” because they went against the majority consensus of their respective societies. As long as the consensus aids in survival, such a consensus is not immoral, even if it brings harm to others within that society.

Naturalism fails to provide an absolute basis for morality meaning that what is moral today could be immoral tomorrow. While rape might be immoral in 2010, especially because it degrades women and could increase an already burgeoning population, in 2015 it could be completely moral if, due to a natural disaster, the human population falls and society tends towards a more patriarchal view, thus not caring about the value of women. Nothing is set in stone and therefore is completely subjective to the will of the society.

The Judeo-Christian worldview, on the other hand, supplies an absolute morality that applies at all times and is not subject to the majority or to any human. The foundation of the Judeo-Christian morality is found in God. As Udo Middelmann explains, “God – a thinking, feeling, creating personality – engages himself with the human being whom he made in his image and who is unlike all the rest of what he created.”[6] Because God created humans, cares for humans, and knows what is best for humans, He established certain laws that protect humans while also drawing them closer to Him. The Judeo-Christian worldview teaches that humans were created to be in fellowship with God and subsequently have a morality that, if followed, creates and nurtures that fellowship with God. The Judeo-Christian morality provides a personal purpose to creation and in so doing, creates a personal ethic.

Applying Morality to the Weak

Though many examples could be given to explain the divide between naturalism and the Judeo-Christian worldview, the most notable divide within society between adherents to naturalism and adherents to the Judeo-Christian worldview stands on the issue of how the weak are to be treated.

Under naturalism, humans lack intrinsic value in that they are merely material. Just as a rock is material, a human is material and thus only different to the rock in degree and not in kind. A rock only becomes valuable when it is viewed as valuable, because it is only material. The same idea of ascribing value applies to humans. Such a view indicates that one becomes a person, that is, one obtains value by meeting a certain criteria. Jim might biologically be a human, but this does not mean Jim is a person and is therefore entitled to certain rights. Donald Green explains:

“All these problems stem from the failure to realize that judgments of ‘humanity,’ ‘personhood,’ or any similar determination of moral protected-ness are not a matter of definition, of finding the intrinsic biological property of an entity that makes it morally protectable, but are instead the outcome of complex moral choice involving many competing considerations. Sometimes these considerations have less to do with the nature of the entity than with the implications of a boundary marker itself.” [7]

What Green explains is that an entity is not merely a person by being that entity, but instead a result of how the entity acts. An example is if one looks at Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith is a thirty-year-old doctor who helps aid society in survival. Due to Mr. Smith’s actions, he is valuable as a person. However, when Mr. Smith is eighty-years-old he will be viewed with less value than he currently has. The same is true that when Mr. Smith was an infant, he lacked the value that he currently holds. Under naturalism, Mr. Smith’s value is up to what he does and what kind of person he develops into; Mr. Smith’s value as a human being is subject to fluctuation based upon what he does and is able to do.

Such justification is found in that value is based upon the characteristics of the individual rather than on the species of the individual. Peter Singer writes, “[A human being has] characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings.”[8] Since certain humans lack traits like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness, such humans are expendable and can be killed for the good of society. He goes so far as to say that disabled infants or senile elderly can be killed because they do not fit the criteria for personhood.[9]

Such a view is allowable because the anthropological view of a naturalist is that what a person does makes the person valuable, rather than being valuable by nature of being human. The atheistic existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre summed up the naturalistic understanding of man quite nicely when he stated, “Being precedes essence.” Thus, being a human is merely a biological state of being and from there, we define our essence. We exist as humans, but we define what it means to be human and what, if any, value is to be placed on being a human person. Since the weak lack the ability to define their essence, add no contribution to the survival of the species since they are generally helpless, and have inferior DNA (in the case of the disabled due to genetic disorders), they are viewed as expendable. Under naturalism, the weak in a society have no protection if naturalism is logically followed to its end.

The Judeo-Christian worldview stands as a complete contradiction to naturalism in terms of how the weak are treated. Under the Judeo-Christian worldview, all humans are made in the image of God. As Francis Schaeffer explains, “And finally, these [liberal] theologians have obviously forgotten God’s view of the worth of every human being as made in the image of God.”[10] Even if weak or currently unconscious or able to make choices, by nature of being a human being a person is viewed as valuable. Under the Judeo-Christian worldview, no one “becomes” a person, but rather is a person by nature of being human and is intrinsically valuable because to be a human is to be in God’s image.

The Judeo-Christian worldview offers protection to the weak in society because it views all humans as having the capacity for rationality and self-consciousness, even if they currently lack the ability to actualize such capacities. The Judeo-Christian worldview offers further protection because it views the moral fiber of society as hinging upon how humans treat other humans.[11] Thus, if the Judeo-Christian worldview were followed to its logical end, one would never dream to harm a disabled infant or a senile elderly person because such people, though currently suffering or currently underdeveloped, are still in the image of God.

Conclusion

The Judeo-Christian worldview stands as a superior counterpart to naturalism. Naturalism does not protect humanity, even those who are conscious and self-aware, because naturalism can always shift what it means to be a “human person.” If the majority decides that having white skin constitutes an element of being a human person, then logically the majority is justified and the minority has no recourse to challenge the majority view (other than overpowering or tricking the majority into changing their views). The Judeo-Christian worldview, alternatively, views all humans as being made in the image of God and therefore has an established explanation. When the Judeo-Christian worldview is followed to its logical end and practiced perfectly, it only results in all humans being treated with dignity and increasing the development of the human species.[12]

Humans simply know a priori that the weak are to be protected. Though the logical conclusion of naturalism is that the weak have no business living with the strong, adherents of naturalism are still human and therefore cannot fully practice their beliefs. They live as if there is a purpose to the existence of weak humans.[13] The naturalist is forced to live in an inconsistent world; he knows one thing, but acts another way, with his actions fully contradicting what he “knows” to be true. He would never dare live naturalism to its logical end and rather will make any defense to remain moral, no matter how illogical such a defense might be. Only the Judeo-Christian worldview can explain why humans can act in a way that contradicts their beliefs. Humans are made in the image of God and therefore will act in a moral way in some cases, even when their beliefs tell them not to.

For a society to prosper and grow, it must adhere to the superior worldview, which is the Judeo-Christian worldview. Naturalism only provides harm for the weak and is arbitrary. Likewise, naturalism goes against the human experience and what humans know to be right. The Judeo-Christian worldview, however, teaches that all humans are in the image of God and are therefore valuable, regardless of disabilities, abilities, beliefs, or degree of consciousness. For a society to survive and provide the common good for all, it must adhere to the Judeo-Christian worldview.

[2] David Mills, Atheist Universe: The Thinking Person’s Answer to Christian Fundamentalism (Berkeley: Ulysses Press, 2006), p. 74

[3] Though there are some debates among Christians on anthropological dualism, most Christian philosophers tend to accept a Thomistic dualism of man, where man is a combination of both the material and immaterial substance and that both substances are equally present in man. Such a view is contrary to a Cartesian view of man, which teaches that man is mostly immaterial (mind) and that the physicality of man is almost an afterthought to what constitutes man. For a better handling of the subject, seeBody-Self Dualism in Contemporary Ethics and Politics by Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, Cambridge University Press, 2009 as well as the article “Aquinas’ Alternative to Cartesian Dualism” by Joshua M. Brown.

[4] David Mills, Atheist Universe, 172

[5] Ibid, 191-203

[6] Udo Middelmann, Christianity Versus Fatalistic Religions in the War Against Poverty (Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2007), p. 12

[7] Donald Green, The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p 39

[8] Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2^nd Ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p 182

[9] Ibid, 191-193

[10] Francis Schaeffer, Whatever Happened to the Human Race?, vol. 5 of The Complete Works of Francis Schaeffer, (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 1982), p. 327

[11] Ibid, 281

[12] Udo Middelmann, War Against Poverty, 14

[13] Francis Schaeffer, Whatever Happened to the Human Race?, 369

Journalistic integrity (or the lack thereof) aside, it is true that the law doesn’t allow for exceptions in abortion or incest. Considering that 93% of abortions occur for social reasons (with only about 1% occurring for rape or incest), there’s little reason to include a caveat in the law concerning rape and incest. Regardless, such a caveat is, logically speaking, unnecessary.

When abortion proponents bring up rape and incest as exceptions, they are often using fallacious reasoning. They are making an emotional appeal in order to support the act of abortion. Not to sound completely callous, I do have sympathy for someone who has been raped and then been left with a pregnancy as a result of that rape. Such an event is tragic and if the family or private organizations cannot help such a woman, I believe the government has a moral obligation to help her. Whether that be through paying for her counseling, paying for her healthcare during and after the pregnancy, or providing adequate and safe housing, the government should take care of her if her family or private organizations fall short.

Regardless, if a fetus is a human person (even if certain capacities haven’t been fully realized) then whether the fetus’ creation was intentional, an accident, or the product of a forced sexual act becomes completely irrelevant when discussing the rights of the fetus. Whatever the paternal contributor did has no bearing on the rights of the fetus. Looking at the issue logically (which one must do when determining the morality of an issue) whether or not a pregnancy was caused by rape is completely superfluous. If the fetus is not a human person or has yet to obtain personhood, then whether the law allows the caveat of rape and incest is irrelevant; the law is arbitrary and unnecessary. If, however, the fetus is a human person, then no caveat for rape is needed because the fetus is still a human being.

Before we bring in the victimhood of the mother (which is legitimate, she is a victim in the case of rape and incest), we must also realize that the fetus is also a victim. The fetus will eventually become an infant, that infant will become a child, that child will become a teenager, and that teenager will become an adult. In all those processes, that child will most likely grow up without a father and/or knowing that he is a product of a rapist. This causes quite a bit of guilt and problems on the part of the child. Just as the mother suffers so too the child suffers.

Another aspect to consider is the moral status of being a victim as opposed to being a victimizer. One must consider if it is better morally to be put into the Gulag for refusing to spy on one’s neighbors, or if it is morally better to spy on one’s neighbors and put them in the Gulag in order to avoid the same punishment for one’s self. Most ethicists and even laypeople will agree that, morally speaking, it is better to be a victim than to be a victimizer. When we look to the issue of abortion, specifically in the case of rape, though the woman is in the morally better position by being the victim, when she seeks an abortion she actually becomes a victimizer; though a victim of rape, she shares the moral equivalency of her rapist when she seeks an abortion as she is murdering a human person.

Such harsh terminology might make some uncomfortable, but before having an emotional response, it is better to truly evaluate what was just said. If the fetus is a human person, then to terminate that life is the equivalent to murder. After all, we hardly ever say that Stalin “terminated potential votes,” but rather that he murdered millions of people. We don’t say that a rapist had “involuntary sexual intercourse,” but rather that he raped a woman. We use such terminology because (1) such terminology appropriately describes what occurred and (2) certain words have emotional connotations. Thus, when we look to abortion, we see:

1) An innocent human person (the fetus)

2) The killing of the innocent human person

Killing an innocent human person is almost always called murder. When a woman, who is a victim of rape, seeks to kill the fetus that is the result of rape, she engages in murder. Though she will always be a victim of rape, she becomes a victimizer when she seeks an abortion, which makes her just as immoral as her rapist. This might be a hard pill to swallow, but it still remains true.

In conclusion, whether or not a pregnancy is caused by rape is completely irrelevant. If the fetus is a human person, then no caveat for rape or incest should be allowed (life of the mother, however, does remain a legitimate caveat that people can voluntarily consider). A human person is still a human person, regardless of how he came into existence.

The other day I came across this post and found it quite interesting. What was more interesting was one of the comments given by someone with the handle of “Operation Counterstrike”:

Yes, abortion is homicide. But abortion on demand is JUSTIFIABLE homicide.

If something is inside your body, then you’re entitled to have it killed. No exceptions. Even if it’s an “innocent” person. If you were inside my body, then I’d be entitled to kill you, and if I were inside your body, you’d be entitled to kill me. In fact if ALL the people in the WHOLE HUMPING WORLD, including the innocent ones, the pregnant ones, and the unborn ones, were inside your body, then you’d be entitled to holocaust them. That’s part of the meaning of the word “your” in the phrase “your body”.

This is really a sophomoric version of Judith Jarvis Thompson’s “body ownership” argument. Though he approaches the argument in a childish and immature manner, it is a real argument. I offered up the following as a response:

OperationCounterstrike is using a sophomoric version of Judith Jarvis Thompson’s body-ownership argument. In all reality, that OC offers up is a bastardized, anti-intellectual version of the argument (thus not really qualifying as the argument itself), but once polished he does bring up a popular argument used in academic circles.

What OC fails to realize is that the argument doesn’t work. No matter how much evidence is presented, he simply won’t budge on this issue (go look at some of his Amazon postings). So I offer this comment as help to others:

On the logical level, this argument falls under the fallacy of special pleading. Certainly I don’t have a right to do what I want with my body when it comes to second-hand smoking or similar activities. The argument presupposes that I have an autonomous right to my body to begin with (this is never substantiated in the argument, but merely assumed) and also presupposes that this alleged right trumps another’s right to identity. This argument, however, never plays out well in courts or ethical examples. In fact, OC’s argument would be the only place such an argument would be “acceptable,” meaning that the argument is more likely special pleading than anything else.

Where the argument also falls under special pleading is that it ignores the mental strain raising children can bring. The argument goes that if an organism, even another human person, is reliant upon you for survival and is connected to you, then you have the right to terminate that organism. But the mental stress that children can cause a parent – causing some parents to kill their children – is very much a physical strain caused by the reliance of the child on the parent. Thus, if the mother is justified in killing the fetus due to physical reliance, then she is just as justified in killing the six-year-old because the child is still physically reliant upon the parent, just in a different manner than when the child was a fetus.

Moving on, Thompson uses the analogy that you’ve awakened to find a world-famous violinist is attached to you and relying on you for his life. He will have to be this way for 9 months. Do you have the ethical right to remove him from yourself knowing that such an action would allow him to die? Trust me, this is an argument OC will bring up (if he already hasn’t, I haven’t read all the comments).

The inherent problem with such an analogy is that it assumes we must all volunteer for something in order to be ethically accountable for that something. For instance, the argument assumes that because I did not volunteer to have the violinist attached to me, I am not ethically obligated to allow the violinist to live. Likewise, because not all mothers volunteer to become pregnant, they are not ethically obligated to continue the pregnancy. However, this is quite an assumption that lacks quite a bit of ground.

Such an idea of volunteerism isn’t even supported in the US law. If a man gets a woman pregnant without the intention of impregnating her, he is still liable to pay child support, regardless of his intention. He certainly didn’t volunteer to be a father, yet he is still held accountable for his actions. We see similar cases in manslaughter charges, statutory rape laws, and many other aspects of the law. In almost every case of grievous errors, a person is held accountable regardless of the person’s intentions.

Thus, as recognized by the legal code and as understood by most ethicists, just because a woman did not volunteer to become pregnant does not mean she is suddenly free from any and all ethical obligations to that child.

Let us also not forget that there is an assumed ethical obligation of parents to their children. So much so that if such an ethical obligation is violated, the Government can and often does get involved. The parent has the ethical obligation to provide for the child and care for the child while keeping the child from harm. Failure to do so will not only invite scorn from the community, but can bring down the heavy-hand of the law as well. This obligation seems to exist whether someone had a child intentionally or simply became pregnant and never went through with an abortion.

Considering the above (that not all ethical obligations are voluntary and parents have ethical obligations to their children), it can actually be said that a fetus does have a right to use her mother’s body. Unlike the violinist (and this is where Thompson’s analogy breaks down) the fetus is partaking on a natural course of development and, though it may not be comfortable for the mother, this is how all humans enter the world. The violinist, alternatively, is relying upon an unnatural environment to stay alive.

To further this point, once the violinist is done with his 9 month treatment, you no longer have an ethical obligation for his well-being. However, a fetus, once outside the womb, is still reliant upon the mother. The mother still has an ethical obligation to that child (unless she has given that obligation to someone else, but even this is done in the interest of the child’s welfare). She must use her body to take care of the child one outside of the womb, just in a different way than before. Though the child is no longer inside her body, the child is still dependent upon the mother’s body (simply in a different manner), thus ruining the idea that the mother’s body is still autonomous.

There is no reason to really accept this argument. For one, it is logically invalid and subject to problems before we even examine the facts. Secondly, it’s arbitrary in that when applied to similar situations, a different ethical code is used. Finally, the only way to respond to any of what I said is to say, “Well the baby is in the womb!” and making birth the threshold; but this is circular. It uses the standard that is under attack as validation. It is akin to someone saying, “The Bible is true because it says it is.” In this case, someone is saying, “Birth is the threshold because it is.” There’s no real reason for it.

One more note on the analogy – seeing as how I have no ethical obligation to the violinist, I could withhold treatment. In fact, there are times where withholding treatment is the ethical thing to do. Abortion, however, is the act of killing and has nothing to do with withholding treatment. It is active instead of passive.

Also posted on: Truth is a Man

Since the rise and dominance of metaphysical naturalism in both science and philosophy, many academics have rejected the traditional Judeo-Christian understanding of the soul.  To be sure, substance dualism–the view that both immaterial and material substances exist–is not a popular position amongst contemporary philosophers of mind.  However, substance dualisms’ fall from grace is not entirely due to naturalistic philosophy.  Another reason for its failure has been its persistent association with Cartesian dualism.[1]

The linkage between substance dualism and Cartesian dualism in contemporary philosophy of mind is unfortunate for two reasons: (1) most philosophers believe Descartes arguments have been soundly refuted, and (2) the Cartesian form of dualism exhibits significant conceptual difficulties.  It seems, then, that it is not substance dualism, per se, that modern philosophers find repugnant, but its widespread Cartesian formulation.

Thankfully, while Christians are committed to some form of substance dualism, they are not necessarily committed to a Cartesian view.  As Eleonore Stump explains, Cartesian dualism is hardly the only game in town for orthodox Christians:

As a matter of historical fact . . . it is not true that a Cartesian sort of dualism has been the view traditional espoused by all major monotheisms.  Aquinas, whose views surely represent one major strand of one major monotheism, is familiar with an account very like Cartesian dualism, which he associates with Plato; and he rejects it emphatically.[2]

Unbeknownst to many, Aquinas proposed a form of substance dualism significantly different from both Plato and Descartes; one which naturalistic philosophers may find harder to refute.

This paper will introduce Thomistic dualism, compare and contrast it with the Cartesian view, and offer several reasons why Christian philosophers should favor this form of substance dualism above the Cartesian model.  It will accomplish this by: (1) outlining Descartes understanding of the mind and the body and posing two formidable difficulties facing it, and (2) outlining Thomistic dualism and explaining how it better addresses the problems facing the Cartesian view.

Descartes and Cartesian Dualism

Cartesian dualism, as it is most commonly formulated, goes something like this:  the mind, being a nonphysical object, is a completely different sort of thing than the body, which is a physical object, “located in space” and comprised of, “atoms familiar to chemistry.”[3] Unlike the body, the mind is completely immaterial, lacking an exact special location, and unable to be seen or touched.[4] Although the mind and the body are two completely different substances, they stand in a causal relationship with one another; each having a distinctive impact on the other.

To understand this causal relationship, one can imagine the mind and body working together in a way much like a scientist controlling a space probe:

Your body is like a probe, sent by NASA to explore a distant planet.  The probe sends pictures back to mission control, where scientists decide what the probe should do next.  Instructions are sent back to the probe which responds accordingly.  The probe itself is entirely unintelligent.  Similarly, information about the world is communicated by the body to the mind; the mind decides on a course of action and communicates the decision back to the body.  The body itself makes no decisions.[5]

As it stands, the body is not autonomous; depending upon the direction of the mind to accomplish anything.

Descartes arrived at these conclusions about the nature of the mind and the brain through a prolonged introspective process which he recorded in his seminal work: Meditations on First Philosophy.  During his meditations, Descartes came to the startling conclusion that he could imagine himself without a body.[6] Conversely, he also realized it was equally impossible for him to doubt that he had a mind: “If I try to doubt I have a mind, I will discover myself with thoughts like ‘I doubt I have a mind’, and so must admit that I have a mind—for the activity of doubting is mental.”[7] Based upon these fundamental introspections, Descartes developed his theory of substance dualism.

As his thinking evolved, Descartes came to the disquieting conclusion that the mind constituted the total essence of the human being.  As he explains, “I know I exist, and meanwhile notice nothing clearly to pertain to my nature or essence, except this alone, that I am a thinking thing, I rightly conclude that my whole essence consists in this one thing, that I am a thinking thing.”[8] Descartes refusal to give the body a place in the essence of a human being was the natural outgrowth of his epistemology; namely, his near complete rejection of empiricism.  For Descartes, the senses could not be trusted, and therefore, the only true knowledge one could have about the world was that which could be arrived at by pure reason.  As a rationalist, the only aspect of his own humanity that he could be totally certain about, was the unavoidable fact that he was a “thinking thing.”[9]

Seeing as how the mind and the body constitute two “ontologically distinct substances”, and that the, “mind alone constitutes the essence of the individual and the body in no way partakes of this essence,” Descartes concluded that the mind could exist completely independent from his body.[10] This is made clear enough in his own words,

Because on the one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am only a thinking thing, not extended, and on the other hand a distinct idea of body in so far as it is only an extended thing, not thinking, it is certain that I am really distinct from my body and can exist without it.[11]

Unsurprisingly, this radical distinction between the mind and body is the source of significant challenges for Cartesian dualists.

To begin with, from a philosophical and scientific perspective, Cartesian dualists fail to provide an adequate account of the, “union of mind and body,” that is, to explain how two ontologically distinct and self-contained substances are capable of working together in a causally integrated way.  Exactly, how is it that the mind (which is immaterial) can have a direct casual affect on the brain (which is material)?  While, this objection does not constitute a defeater for Cartesian dualism, it does constitute a significant conceptual hurtle; one which is responsible for it’s rejection by contemporary philosophers.

Secondly, from a theological and anthropological perspective, Cartesian dualism fails to account for the importance or value of the physical body.  Why is it, that God embodied our souls in the physical realm at all?  Why is it that God insists on resurrecting our bodies in the last days?  Why did God come down as the incarnate word of God—as the physical man Jesus Christ?  Furthermore, why is it wrong, morally, to harm or disparage the human body?  These, and other questions, are exceedingly difficult to answer under the Cartesian model.

It is for this reason that the author recommends the following Thomistic form of substance dualism.

Aquinas and Thomistic Dualism

In order to understand Aquinas’ view of the soul, one must first have a basic grasp of Medieval metaphysics.[12] Like Aristotle, Aquinas and other scholastic philosophers distinguished between two basic dimensions of physical entities: matter and form.[13] To understand Aquinas’ distinction between matter and form, one must strip away any modern conceptions of matter they might have.

To begin with, one should not think of matter in a physical sense; that is, “as an independently existing raw material yet to be formed.”[14] Rather, one must think of matter in terms of “potentiality”; as Aquinas explains, “Matter is that which is not as such a ‘particular thing,’ but is in mere potency to become a ‘particular’ thing.”[15] In other words, matter (or ‘prime matter’ as Aquinas termed it) on its own has no existence; it simply has the potential of being actualized into an existent entity.[16] In this sense, prime matter is, “that which is common to all material things and which is formed into different entities by the second element—the substantial form.”[17]

This leads naturally into the second dimension of all physical entities: the substantial form.  The substantial form is the, “inherent principle which makes the existent entity [a physical object] what it is.”[18] Or, put another way, the substantial form constitutes the essence of and actualization of a physical entity.  One could very well imagine the substantial form as being the “information”, “blue-print”, or “code” underlining all reality and bringing physical existence into being.

When combined with prime matter, the substantial form “becomes the existent [individual] entity,” or substance.[19] Hence, the substantial form acts as the grounding of all physical being; and as such, any physical thing that exists, or has being, has form.  This basic metaphysical truth can be most easily remembered in Aquinas’ famous dictum:  “form gives existence to matter.”[20]

Seeing as how form is the essence of all existing entities, and provides grounding of being, it follows that physical entities are not the only objects which have form.  According to Aquinas, immaterial entities (such as God or Angels) do as well–he referrers to this as the subsistent form.  Subsistent form applies only to immaterial entities which have no physical instantiation—in this sense, it can be understood as, “form existing on its own.”[21]

Aquinas’ motivation for adopting this view was derived from Augustine, who believed that, “being is a matter of having order, species, and mode.”[22] In other words, anything that has being or existence must have some distinguishable order, configuration, or characteristics which make it distinctive from other entities; that is, it must have an essence.  This is why immaterial entities, like angles, must also have form.[23]

Now that these basic metaphysical principles have been elucidated, the reader is in a position to grasp Aquinas’ understanding of the human soul.

Aquinas and the Human Soul

To begin with, Aquinas understood the soul to be the substantial form of the body.  He maintained this view because human beings are a part of physical reality; as such, like any other physical entity, they require a substantial form in order to instantiate or actualize their physical existence.  As the reader will recall, “a substantial material form is the configurational state of a material object that makes that object a member of the kind or species to which it belongs and gives it the causal powers characteristic of things of that kind.”[24] Accordingly, the soul, acting as the substantial form of the body, is what configures and differentiates and gives life to a unique human individual.

J. P. Moreland explains it this way:  “the soul is an individuated essence that makes the body a human body and that diffuses, informs, animates, develops, unifies and grounds the biological functions of its body.”[25] As such, the human person “must be defined as a deep unity of form and matter.”[26] Accordingly, the combination of body and soul, like matter and form, constitutes one complete substance.[27]

However, the soul, unlike the substantial form of other physical objects, may persist upon the death of the body, and unlike other material things is capable of existing without a physical instantiation.  For this reason, Aquinas also identified the soul as being a subsistent form.  In this sense, the human soul is truly unique, in that it has its foot in both the material and immaterial realms.[28] Stump elucidates this paradoxical reality:

The human soul . . . is a configured configurer.  On the one hand, like an angel, it is able to exist and function on its own, apart from matter.  On the other hand, the human soul is not, as Plato thought, a spiritual substance moving the body which is also a substance in its own right; rather, the human soul is the substantial form constituting the material substance that a human being is, and it configures matter, as material forms do.[29]

Hence, the soul, as both the substantial and subsistent form, contains the information that constitutes human essence; and even after we die, and the particles of our body dissipate, the information, that constitutes our essence, our identity, continues to exist.

However, it is important to note that when the soul is separated from the body this constitutes an abnormality; that is, the existence of the soul apart from the body is an incomplete one.  As Aquinas explains, “since the soul is a part of human nature, it does not have perfection of its nature except in union with the body . . . and so, although the soul can exist and intellectively cognize when it is separated from the body, nonetheless it does not have the perfection of its nature.”[30]

Facing the Challenges of Cartesian Dualism

The reader may recall that Thomistic dualism was offered up as a happy alternative to Cartesian dualism in light of the significant challenges facing Descartes theory.  This final section will briefly demonstrate how Thomistic dualism faces up to the considerable challenges facing the Cartesian model and why Christian philosophers should favor this form of substance dualism above others.

The first hurdle facing Cartesian dualism was its inability to define the union between the soul and the body–more pointedly, it’s failure to explain how two ontologically distinct and self-contained substances are capable of working together in a causally integrated way.  While this is a formidable problem for Cartesian dualism; the Thomistic dualist has less to be concerned about.  This is because the Thomistic dualist, unlike the Cartesian, is not postulating the existence of two individual substances; rather they are postulating one complete being whose nature is comprised of both material and immaterial form.

As Aqunias says, “We must not think . . . of the soul and body as though the body had its own form making it a body, to which a soul is super-added, making it a living body; but rather that the body gets its being and its life from the soul.” [31] Under the Thomistic view, the union of body and soul is deep and well defined; hence, the conceptual problem of explaining the causal relationship between soul and body is much less significant.

Regarding the second hurdle, concerning the theological and anthropological significance of the body, Thomistic dualism is completely unfazed.  Unlike the Cartesian, the Thomistic dualist holds that the physical body is part of the nature of man.  Under the Thomistic model it’s considered normal for a soul to be united to a body; and, while the soul can subsist without a body, this is considered abnormal.  Accordingly, it’s easy to see why God places such importance and value on the human body; why God sent his son to exist as a physical man; and why God intends to reunite our souls with a new glorified body at the resurrection.

Conclusion

While Cartesian dualism is viewed by many philosophers as being the only option for someone interested in substance dualism; it is certainly not the only game in town.  As this paper demonstrates, Thomistic dualism offers a dynamic and arguably superior alternative to the Cartesian view.  Unlike Descartes’ model, Aquinas’ conception of the body and soul is comprehensive and avoids the major challenges often thrown at substance dualism; by providing a clearer picture of the soul’s unity with the body and rendering the body intrinsically valuable.  Consequentially, Thomistic dualism is more likely to stand up against the materialistic explanations of the mind which currently dominate western thinking; and place substance dualism back on the table as a viable option.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aquinas, Thomas. Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings. Translated by Ralph McInernny. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.

Graham, George. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.

Moreland, J. P. and Scott B. Rae. Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics. Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000.

———. P. and Stan Wallace. “Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics.” International Philosophical Quarterly XXXV, no. 3 (Fall 1995). http://www.afterall.net/papers/490580.

Moyal, George J. D., ed. Descartes: Critical Assessments Volume III. New York: Routledge, 1991.

Ravenscroft, Ian. Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003.

[2]Ibid., 191-192.

[3]Ian Ravenscroft, Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner’s Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid., 10.

[6]George Graham, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 151.

[7]Ibid.

[8]George J. D. Moyal, ed., Descartes: Critical Assessments Volume III (New York: Routledge, 1991), 150.

[9]Ibid.

[10]J. P. Moreland and Stan Wallace, “Aquinas versus Locke and Descartes on the Human Person and End-of-Life Ethics,” International Philosophical Quarterly XXXV, no. 3 (Fall 1995), http://www.afterall.net/papers/490580.

[11]Moyal, Descartes: Critical Assessments Volume III, 150.

[12] It is the opinion of the author that this is the primary reason why Thomistic dualism is completely overlooked in contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind.

[13] Moreland, International Philosophical Quarterly.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings, trans. Ralph McInernny (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 19.

[21]Stump, Aquinas, 198.

[22] Ibid., 200.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid., 197.

[25] J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000), 202.

[26] Moreland, International Philosophical Quarterly.

[27] This point can be confusing because Thomistic dualism is classified as a form of substance dualism.  The truth be told, Thomistic dualism is a bit strange; it doesn’t fit into any category neatly.  It is not a materialistic reductionist theory which reduces the mind to the brain and it also doesn’t fit well within the confounds of property dualism (the postulation that mental states emerge from brain states).  Seeing as how Thomistic dualism still distinguishes between material and immaterial entities, it makes more sense to classify it as a form of substance dualism.

[28] Stump, Aquinas, 200.

[29] Ibid., 200-201.

[30] Ibid., 201.

[31] Moreland, International Philosophical Quarterly.</I>